In this essay we review a number of values and conflicts involved in human nutrition in order to clarify the sources of resistance to accepting a pump-fed patient on the part of nursing home nurses. The case illustrates the complexities of our feelings and values in the area of intrusion showing the need for continued reflection upon and revision of our intuitive reactions. The case also displays conflict resolution.

The study ascertained (1) whether an observer's scope of justice with reference to either the moral agent or the target person of a moral act, would affect his/her judgements of the ethicality of the act, and (2) whether observer judgements of ethicality parallel the moral agent's decision processes in systematically evaluating the intensity of the moral issue. A scenario approach was used. Results affirmed both research questions. Discussions covered the implications of the findings for the underlying cognitive processes of moral (...) judgements, for the link between judgements of fairness and ethicality, as well as for the debate of ethical absolutism versus relativism. (shrink)

What does it mean to hold that the significant aspects of a literary passage cannot be captured in a paraphrase? Does a change in the description of an act "risk producing a different act" from the one described? Using Jane Austen as an example, we'll consider whether her use of metaphor and symbol really amounts to calling someone a prick, whether her narrative voice changes what it is that is expressed, and whether comedy can hold just as much significance as (...) tragedy without all the heavy breathing. (shrink)

In contrast to most Western countries, routine offer of prenatal screening is considered problematic in the Netherlands. The main argument against offering it to every pregnant woman is that women would be brought into a moral dilemma when deciding whether to use screening or not. This paper explores whether the active offer of a prenatal screening test indeed confronts women with a moral dilemma. A qualitative study was developed, based on a randomised controlled trial that aimed to assess the decision-making (...) process of women when confronted with a test offer. A sample of 59 women was interviewed about the different factors balanced in decision-making. Participants felt themselves caught between a need for knowledge and their unwillingness to take on responsibility. Conflict was reported between wishes, preferences and ethical views regarding parenthood; however, women did not seem to be caught in a choice between two or more ethical principles. Participants balanced the interests of the family against that of the fetus in line with their values and their personal circumstances. Therefore, we conclude that they are not so much faced with an ethical dilemma as conflicting interests. We propose that caregivers should provide the opportunity for the woman to discuss her wishes and doubts to facilitate her decision. This approach would help women to assess the meaning of testing within their parental duties towards their unborn child and their current offspring. (shrink)

This book is good reading. It is the song of man and philosophy, more especially the song of America and American philosophy. Although there are intimations of latter-day weariness and cynicism, the spirit of this work is the spirit of America in her youth, conscious of her newness, with visions of unlimited possibilities--the America of Emerson, Whitman, James, and Dewey.

Institutional Review Board decisions hinge on the availability and interpretation of information. This is demonstrated by the following well-known historical example. In 2001, 24-year-old Ellen Roche died from respiratory distress and organ failure as a result of her participation in a study at Johns Hopkins Asthma and Allergy Center. The non-therapeutic physiological study, “Mechanisms of Deep Inspiration-Induced Airway Relaxation,” was designed to examine airway hyperresponsiveness in healthy individuals in order to better understand the pathophysiology of asthma. Participants inhaled hexamethonium, a (...) chemical ganglionic blocker that was not FDA-approved for use as specified in the experimental protocol. Risks of inhaling hexamethonium, including lung damage, had been reported in the 1950s and ‘60s. An investigation conducted after Roche's death determined that the study's principal investigator had failed to adequately search the medical literature; the protocol submitted for IRB review cited articles indexed in online literature databases that went back only as far as the 1970s. (shrink)

Early work from a leader in analytic philosophy From Parmenides to Wittgenstein, Volume 1: Collected Philosophical Papers is part of a multi-volume publication of G.E.M. Anscombe's collected works. Writing on philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, philosophy of language, and philosophical logic, Anscombe is known as one of analytical Thomisms's most prominent figures. This collection includes her writing on the work of her teacher, Ludwig Wittgenstein, with whom she worked closely as co-editor and translator.

Background Psychiatric electroceutical interventions (PEIs) use electrical or magnetic stimulation to treat mental disorders and may raise different ethical concerns than other therapies such as medications or talk therapy. Yet little is known about stakeholders’ perceptions of, and ethical concerns related to, these interventions. We aimed to better understand the ethical concerns of a variety of stakeholder groups (patients with depression, caregivers of patients, members of the public, and psychiatrists) regarding four PEIs: electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS), (...) deep brain stimulation (DBS), and adaptive brain implants (ABI). Methods We conducted a national survey of these four stakeholder groups, using an embedded video vignette experiment depicting a patient with treatment-resistant depression and her psychiatrist discussing the possibility of treatment with one of the four PEIs. Results Participants’ ethical concerns varied by stakeholder group, by PEI, and by the interaction of the two. The three non-clinician groups tended to have similar ethical concerns, but to differ from psychiatrists. Similar concerns were raised with regard to the two implantable technologies, DBS and ABI. Overall, there was relatively little concern about the involuntary use of PEIs, though some expressed concern about the adequacy of information provided during the consent process. There was also significant concern that patients may not receive helpful therapies. Conclusions To our knowledge, this is the first national survey that includes multiple stakeholder groups and multiple PEI modalities. A better understanding of the ethical concerns of stakeholders can help to shape clinical practice and health care policy regarding PEIs. (shrink)

ABSTRACT One of the standard defenses of Daniel Tosh, Andrew Dice Clay, Bernard Manning, and other stand-up comedians who have been accused of crossing moral lines is that the responses they elicit belong to an aesthetic rather than a moral domain to which standard methods of ethical evaluation are therefore inapplicable. I argue, first, that fictionality does not confer immunity to ethical criticism and, second, that the stance adopted by the stand-up artist is not fully analogous to a fictive one (...) in any event. Whatever the case with respect to the adoption of an alternative persona, the stand-up artist refers in his or her pronouncements to the actual world in a way that a fiction does not. That also suggests susceptibility to ethical criticism, just for different reasons. (shrink)

German legislation demands that decisions about the treatment of mentally incompetent patients require an ‘informed consent’. If this was not given by the patient him-/herself before he/she became incompetent, it has to be sought by the physician from a guardian, who has to be formally legitimized before. Additionally this surrogate has to seek the permission of a Court of Guardianship (Vormundschaftsgericht), if he/she intends to consent to interventions, which pose significant risks to the health or the life of the person (...) under his/her care. This includes ‘end-of-life decisions’. Deviations from this procedure are only allowed in acute emergencies or cases of ‘medical futility’. On the basis of epidemiological and demographical data it can be shown that the vast majority of surrogate decisions on incompetent patients in Germany is not covered by legally valid consent. Moreover, the data suggests that if consent were to be requested according to the legal regulations, both the legal and medical system could realistically never cope with the practical consequences of this. Additionally, empiric research has revealed serious deficits concerning medical ‘end of life-decisions’ and practical performance in palliative care. As a consequence a multidisciplinary discussion has developed in Germany about the reform of present legislation with respect to key-issues like• the assessment of mental competence• the options for exercising patient self-determination via advance directives and durable powers of attorney• the improvement of palliative care facilities,• the clarification of formal procedures for surrogate decision-making in health care and towards the end of life• and the possibilities and their limitations of controlling these decision-making processes ‘externally’ (e.g., by Guardianship Courts or committees).The authors discuss those proposals, which clearly dominate the present debate: They all aim to comply with the scientific basis of German law, jurisdiction and the European traditions of philosophy of health care and bioethics. (shrink)

In Greek mythology, the Chimera is a fire-breathing monster with three heads: one of a lion, one of a horned goat, and one of a powerful dragon. Of similar construction is the presence of three structures in US society, whiteness, patriarchy, and capitalism, which are overwhelmingly represented, valued, and espoused when examining areas of progress, i.e., family income, poverty rates, high school and college graduation rates, and home ownership. This modern American three-headed beast controls, manipulates, and permeates all aspects of (...) US society irrespective of class, culture, or gender. Using critical race theory and critical whiteness studies, this critically interpretive parable draws from the ways in which whiteness, patriarchy, and capitalism function in social, cultural, economic, and educational spheres. The parable tells the story of Sue Libertad and analyzes how this metaphorical Chimera, despite its ubiquity, silently permeates all aspects of her life. Not until a tragic outbreak occurs, does the hegemony of this chimera erodes and Sue. (shrink)

A compelling exploration of the convergence of Jane Austen’s literary themes and characters with David Hume’s views on morality and human nature. Argues that the normative perspectives endorsed in Jane Austen's novels are best characterized in terms of a Humean approach, and that the merits of Hume's account of ethical, aesthetic and epistemic virtue are vividly illustrated by Austen's writing. Illustrates how Hume and Austen complement one another, each providing a lens that allows us to expand and elaborate on the (...) ideas of the other Proposes that literature may serve as a thought experiment, articulating hypothetical cases which allow the reader to test her moral intuitions Contributes to ongoing debates on the philosophy of literature, ethics, and emotion. (shrink)

Justifying involuntary psychiatric treatment on the basis of a judgment that a person lacks capacity is usually expressed in terms of a person’s ability to make a decision about his or her health and treatment. Typically, this relates to the ability to refuse treatment. Exactly what “capacity” means, however, and how one determines when another individual lacks capacity, or lacks sufficient capacity, in this context is particularly controversial, with the United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities insisting (...) that involuntary treatment be abandoned altogether and capacity tests avoided.Capacity is a concept that has multiple meanings and applications across different disciplines and... (shrink)

Upon entering the examination room, Caitlyn encounters a woman sitting alone and in distress. Caitlyn introduces herself as the hospital ethicist and tells the woman, Mrs. Dennis, that her aim is to help her reach a decision about whether to perform an autopsy on her recently deceased husband. Mrs. Dennis begins the encounter by telling the ethicist that she has to decide quickly, but that she is very torn about what to do. Mrs. Dennis adds, “My sons disagree about the (...) autopsy.” As a standardized patient, a specialized actor, the woman playing Mrs. Dennis has already delivered the same opening lines several times to different learners practicing their clinical ethics consultation skills. An SP encounter is a simulated patient encounter used for educational purposes that requires the standardization of verbal and behavioral responses. In the encounter, the simulator, or “patient,” uses a scripted medical history to enable the learner to employ a certain skill, say, the ability to perform a neurological exam. The use of standardized patients in the evaluation of clinical skills has become a staple in medical education. To tackle the challenge of teaching clinical ethics consultation skills, we have incorporated SP encounters into the curriculum of the Bioethics Program of The Union Graduate College and the Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai. SP encounters are incorporated into one of our onsite classes, the Onsite Clinical Ethics Practicum, and they are part of the capstone examination, which all of our graduates must complete successfully. The inclusion of simulated encounters into the curriculum is one way in which we equip our students with the core competencies specified by the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities Task Force for clinical ethicists. (shrink)

Introduction This article is a response to Zagouras, Ellick, and Aulisio who presented a case study justifying the questioning of the capacity and autonomy of a young woman with a physical disability who was pregnant and facing coercive pressure to terminate. Case description Julia is described as a 26-year-old woman with a neurological disability that requires her to receive assistance with activities of daily living. She was described as living with her parents who provided her with personal care assistance. Julia (...) became pregnant and her parents wished her to terminate because they did not want to care for her child in addition to her. In fact, Julia's parents threatened her with institutionalization if she did not elect to terminate the pregnancy. Her health care team questioned her decision-making capacity based on her alleged “mental age” and experiences of being sheltered and excluded. The health care team used directive tactics to convince Julia to terminate the pregnancy, which describe as both an ethical and feminist intervention. Discussion The current authors take issue with the case analysis provided by and argue that they neglected to account for numerous instances of systemic ableism that adversely affected Julia, demonstrated prejudicial and judgmental attitudes toward pregnancy and disability, inappropriately questioned her decision-making capacity by infantilizing her, misconstrued the feminist concept of relational autonomy, and colluded with coercive interference from family members. This is a classic example of discriminatory and culturally incompetent reproductive health care for a disabled woman. (shrink)

We often act in ways that create duties for ourselves: we adopt a child and become obligated to raise and educate her. We also sometimes act in ways that eliminate duties: we get divorced, and no longer have a duty to support our now ex-spouse. When is it morally permissible to create or to eliminate a duty? These questions have almost wholly evaded philosophical attention. In this paper we develop answers to these questions by arguing in favor of the asymmetric (...) approach to deontic value. This approach holds that we must assign zero deontic value to fulfilling a duty, while assigning negative deontic value to violating that duty. Taking the opposing more natural symmetric approach, which holds that fulfilling duties has positive deontic value, leads to perverse recommendations about when to create or eliminate duties. A formal proof supporting the asymmetric approach is offered. We further show that moral theories require a consequentialist component to explain why we sometimes have duties to create or maintain duties. (shrink)

Ludwig Wittgenstein was born in 1889, son of parents of Jewish extraction but not Jewish religion. Asked how his family came by the name ‘Wittgenstein’ Ludwig said they had been court Jews to the princely family and so had taken the name when Jews were required by law to have European-style names. The father, Karl, was a Protestant, the mother a Catholic. The Jewish blood was sufficient to bring the family later on into danger under Hitler's Nuremberg Laws. They did (...) not think of themselves as Jews or belong to the Jewish community in Vienna. The children were brought up sort-of Catholic though so far as I know only the eldest, Hermine, towards the end of her life, took this seriously and made a profession of faith before friends and household. At 9 years of age Ludwig and Paul, a year or two older than Ludwig, talked together and decided that their religion was all nonsense. Paul became a pianist of some fame, but soon after his debut in Vienna he became a wounded prisoner on the Russian front and his arm was lopped off by a surgeon who did not know he was a pianist. (shrink)

The onomasticon of Hellenistic Uruk demonstrates that, in some cases, individuals with Greek names were included in otherwise Babylonian families. Often, such Greek names have been interpreted by scholars as evidence for Hellenization. This article suggests an alternate explanation, based on evidence throughout the family trees for a series of naming practices that focus on the perpetuation of names of female relatives and transmission of preferred family names through maternal lines. Particularly important to this discussion are the practices of mammonymy, (...) a term coined here to refer to papponymy’s gendered parallel, i.e., the naming of a girl after her grandmother or other female ancestor, and the practice, previously unexamined in the Assyriological literature, of “maternal-line papponymy,” the tradition of naming a son for his maternal grandfather or other male ancestor from a maternal line. Maternal-line papponymy can be observed in family trees in which the members bear only Babylonian names, as well as in family trees that include individuals with Babylonian names and individuals with Greek names. The Greek names used for boys are often those of fathers or grandfathers of women with Greek names who married into these Babylonian families. This article argues that the incorporation of Greek names into the elite Babylonian families of Hellenistic Uruk cannot be assumed to be straightforward evidence of impulses toward “Hellenization.” Rather, this evidence indicates that Greek names were given to sons in such families within the context of traditional Babylonian maternal-line naming practices. This finding has important implications for scholarship’s understanding of acculturation and the display of cultural identity in Hellenistic Babylonia. (shrink)

The Alternative Model of Personality Disorders integrates several theoretical models of personality functioning, including interpersonal theory. The interpersonal circumplex dimensions of warmth and dominance can be conceptualized as traits similar to those in AMPD Criterion B, but interpersonal theory also offers dynamic hypotheses about how these variables that change from moment to moment, which help to operationalize some of the processes alluded to in AMPD Criterion A. In the psychotherapy literature, dynamic interpersonal behaviors are thought to be critical for identifying (...) therapeutic alliance ruptures, yet few studies have examined moment-to-moment interpersonal behaviors that are associated with alliance ruptures at an idiographic level. The current study examined the concurrent and cross-lagged relationships between interpersonal behaviors and alliance ruptures within each session in the famous Gloria films. Interpersonal behaviors as well as alliance ruptures were calculated at half minute intervals for each dyad. We identified distinct interpersonal patterns associated with alliance ruptures for each session: Gloria ’s warmth was positively related with withdrawal ruptures concurrently in the session with Carl Rogers; Gloria’s dominance and coldness were related with increased confrontation ruptures in the session with Fritz Perls concurrently, while her coldness was also predicted by confrontation ruptures at previous moments; lastly, both Gloria’s dominance and Albert Ellis’s submissiveness were positively related with withdrawal ruptures. These interpersonal patterns demonstrated the promise of using AMPD dimensions to conceptualize momentary interpersonal processes related to therapy ruptures, as well as the clinical importance of attuning to repetitive, dyad-specific interpersonal cues of ruptures within each session. (shrink)

This compact and innovative book tackles one of the central issues in drug policy: the lack of a coherent conceptual structure for thinking about drugs. Drugs generally fall into one of seven categories: prescription, over the counter, alternative medicine, common-use drugs like alcohol, tobacco and caffeine; religious-use, sports enhancement; and of course illegal street drugs like cocaine and marijuana. Our thinking and policies varies wildly from one to the other, with inconsistencies that derive more from cultural and social values than (...) from medical or scientific facts. Penalties exist for steroid use, while herbal remedies or cold medication are legal. Native Americans may legally use peyote, but others may not. Penalties may vary for using different forms of the same drug, such as crack vs. powder cocaine. Herbal remedies are unregulated by the FDA; but medical marijuana is illegal in most states. Battin and her contributors lay a foundation for a wiser drug policy by promoting consistency and coherency in the discussion of drug issues and by encouraging a unique dialogue across disciplines. The contributors are an interdisciplinary group of scholars mostly based at the University of Utah, and include a pharmacologist, a psychiatrist, a toxicologist, a trial court judge, a law professor, an attorney, a diatary specialist, a physician, a health expert on substance abuse, and Battin herself who is a philosopher. They consider questions like the historical development of current policy and the rationales for it; scientific views on how drugs actually cause harm; how to define the key notions of harm and addiction; and ways in which drug policy can be made more consistent. They conclude with an examination of the implications of a consistent policy for various disciplines and society generally. The book is written accessibly with little need for expert knowledge, and will appeal to a diverse audience of philosophers, bioethicists, clinicians, policy makers, law enforcement, legal scholars and practitioners, social workers, and general readers, as well as to students in areas like pharmacy, medicine, law, nursing, sociology, social work, psychology, and bioethics. (shrink)

BackgroundIn the Canadian Alliance for Healthy Hearts and Minds (CAHHM) cohort, participants underwent magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) of the brain, heart, and abdomen, that generated incidental findings (IFs). The approach to managing these unexpected results remain a complex issue. Our objectives were to describe the CAHHM policy for the management of IFs, to understand the impact of disclosing IFs to healthy research participants, and to reflect on the ethical obligations of researchers in future MRI studies.MethodsBetween 2013 and 2019, 8252 participants (...) (mean age 58 ± 9 years, 54% women) were recruited with a follow-up questionnaire administered to 909 participants (40% response rate) at 1-year. The CAHHM policy followed a restricted approach, whereby routine feedback on IFs was not provided. Only IFs of severe structural abnormalities were reported.ResultsSevere structural abnormalities occurred in 8.3% (95% confidence interval 7.7–8.9%) of participants, with the highest proportions found in the brain (4.2%) and abdomen (3.1%). The majority of participants (97%) informed of an IF reported no change in quality of life, with 3% of participants reporting that the knowledge of an IF negatively impacted their quality of life. Furthermore, 50% reported increased stress in learning about an IF, and in 95%, the discovery of an IF did not adversely impact his/her life insurance policy. Most participants (90%) would enrol in the study again and perceived the MRI scan to be beneficial, regardless of whether they were informed of IFs. While the implications of a restricted approach to IF management was perceived to be mostly positive, a degree of diagnostic misconception was present amongst participants, indicating the importance of a more thorough consent process to support participant autonomy.ConclusionThe management of IFs from research MRI scans remain a challenging issue, as participants may experience stress and a reduced quality of life when IFs are disclosed. The restricted approach to IF management in CAHHM demonstrated a fair fulfillment of the overarching ethical principles of respect for autonomy, concern for wellbeing, and justice. The approach outlined in the CAHHM policy may serve as a framework for future research studies.Clinical trial registrationhttps://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/nct02220582. (shrink)

A good deal of attention has been recently focused on the presumed advertising excesses of the healthcare industry in its promotion techniques to healthcare professionals, whether through offering gratuities such as gifts, honoraria, or travel support2-6 or through deception. Two basic concerns have been expressed: Does the acceptance of gratuities bias the recipient, tainting his or her responsibilities as the patient's agent? Does acceptance of the gratuity by the healthcare professional contribute to the high cost of healthcare products? The California (...) Society of Hospital Pharmacists was recently asked by its members to formulate a policy for an appropriate relationship between the Society and the healthcare industry, addressing these concerns. In formulating its policy, it became clear that the Society depended on healthcare industry support, gathered through journal advertising, fees for booths at its various educational events, and grants for speakers. (shrink)

Erratum to: Bioethical InquiryDOI 10.1007/s11673-012-9391-xLobna Rouhani, University of Melbourne, is a co-author of the article “Genetic Research and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians” (2012, 419–432) that was published in the Journal of Bioethical Inquiry’s 9(4) symposium “Cases and Culture.” Her name was omitted from the publication and she should be credited as the third author of this article.

One hundred years separates the birth of T. Campanella from that of G. B. Vico. This collection of essays, published in 1969 by the Archives of Philosophy, is the end result of a congress held in Rome commemorating the birth of both philosophers. Campanella and Vico are celebrated in the same volume on the assumption of ideal affinities besides the accidental circumstances of having been born a century apart. Unfortunately, only one essay is expressly devoted to the analysis of Campanella's (...) and Vico's metaphysics. While the first two papers consider Campanella's medical biography and his epistemology, the last four are dedicated solely to various aspects of Vico's thought. On Iacobelli Isoldi falls the responsibility of justifying the title of the volume. But her attempt to demonstrate a family resemblance between Vico's and Campanella's metaphysics remains farfetched. For Campanella's way of solving the theoretical problem arising from Descartes' dualism issues in inevitable skepticism. Campanella never abandoned the position that the cogito is a vehicle of certainty, but not a criterion of truth. Vico on the other hand, overcomes his initial skepticism by transforming the criterion of truth into a criterion of certainty. In the New Science he demonstrates how man can possess true knowledge of the social and historical sciences. To demonstrate that this symposium had been assembled for reasons other than physical convenience, more papers on possible relations between the Dominican friar of Cosenza and the professor of eloquence of Naples would have been a desideratum.--L. M. P. (shrink)

The writer Anna M. Stoddart published biographies of Isabella Bird and the classical scholar John Stuart Blackie before this 1908 life of the educationalist Hannah E. Pipe. Pipe was sent in 1847 to Chorlton high school, run by William Ballantyne Hodgson, who mapped out for her a teaching career. This biography was written for, and at the urging of, Pipe's ex-pupils, concerned to record her life 'before it crumbles into oblivion'. She opened her first school in Manchester, but moved to (...) London in 1856: Stoddart herself was one of her staff; music was taught by Sterndale Bennett, and science by William Huggins. The school was enormously successful, and Pipe also became involved in other philanthropic causes, being a friend of Octavia Hill and F. D. Maurice. This is a fascinating account of an inspiring teacher and educational pioneer. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 62.3 (2001) 505-522 [Access article in PDF] Mary Astell's Ironic Assault on John Locke's Theory of Thinking Matter E. Derek Taylor Mary Astell (1666-1731), most famous today for her call for the establishment of Protestant nunneries in Serious Proposal to the Ladies, Part I (1694) and for her acute Reflections Upon Marriage (1700), has lurked for years at the edges of that infinitely (...) contentious category "feminism," but she is only now beginning to receive her rightful inheritance as a theological and philosophical thinker, probably the title she would most have preferred. 1 This is not to say that Astell's Christian-Platonism has been ignored. In her 1986 biography Ruth Perry gave cogent expression to the centrality of Astell's idealist Christianity to all aspects of her thought 2 and in the same year, Bridget Hill thoughtfully warned her readers against attempting to force Astell, a religious conservative, "into some preconceived idea of what late seventeenth and early eighteenth century feminism ought to have been." 3 More recently, Patricia Springborg has written two significant essays that rely in part on Astell's more neglected theological-philosophical works, Letters concerning the Love of God (1695), a collection of Astell's correspondence with John Norris of Bemerton (1657-1711), and The Christian Religion, As Professed by a Daughter of the Church of England (1705; 3d edition 1730), far and away her most developed theological-philosophical [End Page 505] statement. 4 Despite these important forays, however, both Letters and Christian Religion continue to be largely ignored, as is suggested by the relative dearth of scholarly work on either text and the short shrift each receives in anthologies of Astell's works. 5 Despite the great popularity of Letters throughout the eighteenth century and despite the fact that, as Springborg points out, Astell considered Christian Religion "her magnum opus," neither text has found new life in a modern edition. 6This omission creates a rather vexing problem for would-be scholars of Astell's philosophical and theological ideas. The major primary texts themselves not being available, we have little choice but to rely on the limited accounts of other scholars for our information. Over a decade ago, for instance, The Journal of the History of Philosophy published a long note by Kathleen M. Squadrito on "Mary Astell's Critique of John Locke's View of Thinking Matter," and hers has since been the standard (if not quite only) account of this historically fascinating and important philosophical comment in Christian Religion.7 Squadrito wants, she writes, to "present a short account of [Astell's] work and her criticism of Locke's view of thinking matter." 8 Unfortunately, Squadrito's account of Astell's "work" is significantly flawed, which leads her to serious mischaracterizations of Astell's "criticism" of Locke's hypothesis. Briefly put, Astell's "own philosophy" in Christian Religion does not, as Squadrito claims, emerge "as an attempted reconciliation of the views of Norris and Locke" 9 ; because she supposes it does, however, Squadrito is able to present Astell's critique of Locke's theory [End Page 506] of thinking matter as a respectful, even-handed philosophical analysis, a theoretical bridge, as it were, between the Platonism of Norris and the Empiricism of Locke. As we shall see, Astell's critique of Locke's hypothesis actually amounts to a bitterly ironic assault, wherein Astell does not so much build bridges as burn them. Just why Astell in Christian Religion decided not to strike a middling position between Locke and Norris, and how this decision invigorated her attack on Locke's materialist hypothesis, are the primary questions this essay seeks to answer. In order to arrive at such answers, however, it is necessary first to examine the text in which Astell does attempt to carve out a position between Locke and Norris, namely Astell and Norris's Letters.The basic history of Letters is well enough understood. Mary Astell, a well-read young woman of significant perspicacity, first wrote in... (shrink)

We submit this brief in support of the Nonhuman Rights Project’s efforts to secure habeas corpus relief for the elephant named Happy. We reject arbitrary distinctions that deny adequate protections to other animals who share with protected humans relevantly similar vulnerabilities to harms and relevantly similar interests in avoiding such harms. We strongly urge this Court, in keeping with the best philosophical standards of rational judgment and ethical standards of justice, to recognize that, as a nonhuman person, Happy should be (...) released from her current confinement and transferred to an appropriate elephant sanctuary, pursuant to habeas corpus. (shrink)

Is there an effect of depressed mood on the interpretation of ambiguity? Are depressed individuals biased to interpret ambiguous information in a negative manner? We used a cross-modal semantic priming task to look for evidence of a negative interpretative bias. Participants listened to ambiguous prime sentences (e.g., Joan was stunned by her final exam mark) and made lexical decisions to target words presented immediately after the sentence offset or after a delay of 1000 ms or 2000 ms. For the semantically (...) related targets, the target was negatively related (distress), positively related (success), or neutrally related (grades) to the ambiguous prime. The experiment was conducted with and without a negative mood induction. The expectation was that depressed participants would be more likely to consider the negative interpretations of the ambiguous primes and would therefore experience larger priming effects for negatively related targets. Although there were large priming effects for all semantically related targets, there was no evidence of a negative interpretative bias. (shrink)

The paper deals with the understanding of proper names. Though the theme goes across various disciplines – e.g. semantics, epistemology, psychology – the paper examines only selected semantic and cognitive aspects of the problem. The question runs: How should we comprehend the thesis of understanding a proper name as knowing what the name refers to? What kind of knowledge is involved here? The question is posed within the direct reference theory framework enriched by the notion of singular proposition and the (...) compositionality principle. The distinction between an expression and an utterance of it is accepted and the original question is split up accordingly. As for expressions , to understand a proper name is to grasp a meaning axiom along the lines of D. Davidson and J. McDowell. As for utterances of expressions, to understand an utterance of a proper name is to know a piece of information concerning the referent of the name; ideally, it is a fact that can be expressed by an identity statement claiming that the referent of the name under discussion is identical with the individual about which the speaker has a mental file at her disposal. (shrink)

This article discusses the practice and development of organ donation by capital prisoners in China. It analyzes the issue of informed consent regarding organ donation from capital prisoners in light of Confucian ethics and expounds the point that under the influence of Confucianism, China is a country that attaches great importance to the role of the family in practicing informed consent in various areas, the area of organ donation from capital prisoners included. It argues that a proper form of organ (...) donation from capital prisoners can be justified within the Confucian moral context in which the proper interests of capital prisoners and their families, the benefit of organ receptors, and a rightful order of society should all be appropriately considered. From the Confucian perspective, the act of donating organs from a capital prisoner must be decided by both the prisoner and his/her family (i.e., each side should hold a veto power), whereas such donation, in the proper circumstance protected by a rightful procedure, should be appreciated as a morally praiseworthy act of the prisoner who is willing to make the final effort to repent and correct his/her evil conduct and to leave something good to the world. (shrink)

This book celebrates the work of Patricia Werhane, an iconic figure in business ethics. This festschrift is a collection of articles that build on Werhane’s contributions to business ethics in such areas as Employee Rights, the Legacy of Adam Smith, Moral Imagination, Women in Business, the development of the field of business ethics, and her contributions to such fields as Health Care, Education, Teaching, and Philosophy. All papers are new contributions to the management literature written by well-known business ethicists, such (...) as Norman Bowie, Richard De George, Ronald Duska, Edwin Hartman, Michael Hoffman, Mollie Painter-Morland, Mark Schwartz, Andrew Wicks, and others. The volume is comprised of articles that reflect on Werhane’s work as well as build on it as a way to advance further research. At the end of the festschrift, Pat Werhane provides responses to each chapter. The first chapter of the book also includes the overview of Patricia Werhane’s work and her academic career. The book is written to appeal to management scholars and graduate students interested in the areas of Business Ethics, Modern Capitalism, and Human Rights. Patricia Werhane is one of the most distinguished figures in the field of business ethics. She was a founder of the field, she is one of its leading scholars, and she has had a profound impact on the world of business practice. Among her many accomplishments, Pat is known for her original work on moral imagination, she is an acclaimed authority on employee rights in the workplace, and she is one of the leading scholars on Adam Smith. Having been active in Academia for over 50 years, Werhane is a prolific author of over a hundred articles and book chapters, and the author or editor of twenty-seven books, including Adam Smith and his Legacy for Modern Capitalism, Moral Imagination and Management Decision-Making, and co-authored books Organization Ethics in Health Care, Alleviating Poverty Through Profitable Partnerships, Obstacles to Ethical Decision-Making, Corporate Responsibility: The American Experience, and Research Approaches to Business Ethics and Corporate Responsibility. (shrink)

Context: To speak of constructivism -- and in particular of radical constructivism -- in education is to place oneself on a field which, like any other academic field, is the scene of tensions, debates, and indeed battles. While such controversies are, predictably enough, fought out between the partisans of constructivism and those defending other theses, they are also fought out between the constructivists themselves, as a number of group works have brought out (e.g., Steffe & Gale 1995; SRED 2001). In (...) other words, constructivists do not express their views in unison whenever there is a question on the development of knowledge (an individual or collective matter?), the underpinnings of knowledge (be they of a psychological, sociological or other type) or, as humorously noted by Quale (2007), that "sin" which is said to consist in the relativist mode of questioning or critique authorized by constructivism. Purpose: In this paper, we would like to contribute to this discussion and to this plurality of ways of embedding oneself in constructivism, in particular by bringing out (as was so acutely shown by Ernst von Glasersfeld 1987a, 1995, 2007) that while constructivism offers a basis on which to revisit the question of knowledge, its contributions nevertheless extend well beyond this single preoccupation. By reincorporating "the properties of the observer" into his or her discourse as well as the conditions, stakes and issues surrounding the utterance in question, in short, by reincorporating the question of power into the utterance-making, constructivism also provides a basis for revisiting the "Great Divides" -- that is, the (unequal) relationships between the various forms of knowledge as well as the (unequal) modes of evidence and authority that accompany these relations. Method: Through an examination of three topics, that is the "racism" of intelligence, the Semmelweis affair, and the question of endogenous knowledge, we will attempt to explicate various insights afforded by constructivism. Conclusion: So doing, we will show that radical constructivism, in its recognition of the plurality of possible modes of description and explanation, contributes to a form of epistemological democracy. (shrink)

Bhattacharyya, K. The Advaita concept of subjectivity.--Deutsch, E. Reflections on some aspects of the theory of rasa.--Nakamura, H. The dawn of modern thought in the East.--Organ, T. Causality, Indian and Greek.--Chatterjee, M. On types of classification.--Lacombe, O. Transcendental imagination.--Bahm, A. J. Standards for comparative philosophy.--Herring, H. Appearance, its significance and meaning in the history of philosophy.--Chang Chung-yuan. Pre-rational harmony in Heidegger's essential thinking and Chʼan thought.--Staal, J. F. Making sense of the Buddhist tetralemma.--Enomiya-Lassalle, H. M. The mysticism of Carl (...) Albrecht and Zen.--Parrinder, G. The nature of mysticism.--Cairns, G. E. Axiological contributions of East and West to the spiritual development of mankind.--Mayeda, S. Śaṇkara's view of ethics.--Mercier, A. On peace.--Barlingay, S. S. A discussion of some aspects of Gaudapāda's philosophy. (shrink)

Psychiatrists encounter persons from diverse cultures who profess experiences (e.g., communicating with spirits) that evoke intuitions of abnormality. This view might not be shared with the person or her/his cultural peers, raising questions concerning the justification of such intuitions. This article explores three positions relevant to the process of justification. The relativist position transfers powers of judgment to the subject’s peers yet neglects individual values and operates with a discredited holistic view of culture. The clinical-ethnographic position remedies this by suspending (...) judgment subject to understanding the individual in a sociocultural context yet finds objections with the universalist-scientific position: objective standards exist and could justify intuitions of abnormality cross-culturally. This article argues that the claim to objectivity is value-laden, reflecting instead a brand of normality and relationship to reality further upheld through epistemological utility and valued technological progress. In conclusion, it is suggested that the clinical-ethnographic position takes personal values and context seriously, both of which are crucial for responsible clinical practice. (shrink)

In a famous passage in her book, Intention , Professor G. E. M. Anscombe argues that we can only render intelligible the idea of someone wanting a thing if we know under what aspect the person sees the thing as desirable. The wanted thing must be characterized by the wanter as desirable in some respect. ‘[What] is required for our concept of “wanting”’, she says, ‘is that a man should see what he wants under the aspect of some good’ . (...) And furthermore, ‘the good conceived by the agent to characterize the thing must really be one of the many forms of good’ . Thus, while the object of desire need only be conceived as good by the wanter, and need not be really good, this can only be because the object does not have the desirable character the wanter believes it to have, not because the character supposed to be desirable is not really so. Desire cannot but be for one of the real forms of good. (shrink)

Since the Nuremberg trials (1947–1949), informed consent has become central for ethical practice in patient care and biomedical research. Codes of ethics emanating from the Nuremberg Code (1947) recognize the importance of protecting patients and research subjects from abuses, manipulation and deception. Informed consent empowers individuals to autonomously and voluntarily accept or reject participation in either clinical treatment or research. In some cases, however, the underlying mental or physical condition of the individual may alter his or her cognitive abilities and (...) compromise the informed consent process. This is particularly true in chronic psychiatric conditions such as Treatment-Resistant Depression (TRD), where individuals may fail to respond to traditional antidepressant treatments (e.g., psychotherapy, pharmacotherapy). Moreover, it may raise further concerns for an individual’s motivation to consent and the level of understanding of the treatment or research procedure. This paper focuses on the informed consent process for Vagus Nerve Stimulation (VNS) in the treatment of individuals diagnosed with TRD. Specifically, the paper addresses how depression may affect the decision-making capacity of an individual and the potential ethical and legal impact of failure to appreciate the seven elements of the consenting process (competence, voluntariness, disclosure, recommendation, understanding, decision, and authorization). To ensure the protection of vulnerable individuals with psychiatric disorders such as TRD and promote ethical behavior in biomedical research and patient care while avoiding potential legal pitfalls, we propose a paradigm that requires a stringent evaluation process of decision-making capacity for informed consent. (shrink)

This paper examines the adequacy of commitment change, as a measure of the successful resolution of a difference of opinion. I argue that differences of opinion are only effectively resolved if commitments undertaken in argumentation survive beyond its conclusion and go on to govern an arguer’s actions in everyday life, e.g., by serving as premises in her practical reasoning. Yet this occurs, I maintain, only when an arguer’s beliefs are changed, not merely her commitments.

My dissertation investigates the requirements of procreative justice. The procreative justice problem is that parents' interest in procreation conflicts with children's interest in optimal birth conditions. Intergenerational reciprocity is the principle that adjudicates this conflict: reciprocity dictates that children demand no more of their parents' procreative practices than they themselves are willing to abide by as adults and dig parents only procreate in accordance with principles dig they would have wanted their own parents to have followed. I develop a Rawlsian (...) Contractualist theory, grounded in the view of justice as the principles that would result from self-interested rational choice under fair bargaining conditions, i.e. unbiased rational prudence over the course of a lifetime by agents who know that they will be born children and grow into adults who may want to procreate. ;This deliberation yields three principles: The Obvious Principle bans procreation that undermines the interests of both prospective parents and prospective children or involves risking/sustaining a major burden for the sake of a minor benefit. The Balance Principle permits procreation only when it would not be irrational for the prospective parent to accept for herself the very same risk her procreation imposes on her prospective child, in exchange for permission to procreate under these circumstances. The Motivation Restriction requires that procreation be at least partially, yet still prominently, motivated by a desire to raise, nurture, love, and care for one's future child once it is born. These principles are defended against rival principles and applied to a wide variety of cases. ;Stymied by metaphysical paradoxes and confusion about persons and existence, contemporary ethicists have struggled to formulate a sound theory of procreative justice that provides more than bare-bones consideration of children's interests. I argue that these efforts have failed. Whereas procreative liberty principles, including Feinberg's Birth Rights and Parfit's Non-Identity Problem principles, neglect children's interests, strictly paternalistic principles, e.g. Benatar's Asymmetry principle, neglect parental interests. My theory of procreative justice provides a much needed middle-ground position which promotes and protects the interests of prospective parents and children. (shrink)

We often appeal to the notion of an agent’s commitment to action to characterize, e.g., an agent’s faithfulness to a promise she has given to another, her robust disposition to pursue a goal she values or cares about, and her determination to stick to that goal. In the philosophy of action, that notion is often associated with the idea of an agent’s intention to act. In ethics, it is associated primarily with the idea of an agent’s commitment to, or endorsement (...) of, a certain norm. This essay argues that both these ideas, of intention and of normative endorsement, are central to the –or, at least, an—ordinary notion of an agent’s (psychological) commitment to action. In so doing, the essay also sheds light on important features of intention. -/- Keywords: commitment – intention – normative endorsement – stability across contexts – coordination. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:526 BOOK REVIEWS learned how to integrate satisfaction into love (91, 113, 119, 124, 136, 186, 192, 198; cp. 37). Indeed, it is Aquinas's gradual integration of satisfaction as a motive for the Incarnation subordinate to love (166) that enables Aquinas aptly to locate satisfaction within the Christian life (cp. 47, 136, 142, 166) and accounts for Cessario's subtitle. Third, I am not clear on Ccssario's (or my own!) (...) stand on how we ought sort out the respects in which Thomas's and our perspectives merge (cp. xiv). In his conclusion Cessario is cautious, suggesting that "if the term ' satisfaction ' cannot be restored to current usage, then certainly the substance of Saint Thomas's understanding of satisfaction can and should be." (256). But, given Cessario's own persuasive display of the way satisfactio pervades the very texture of Aquinas's theology, I am not sure we can have the "substance" without the term-or vice-versa. Clearly Cessario thinks the merging is substantive. But he himself teaches us that supporting this claim involves supporting claims for exegetical, liturgical ecclesial, and other practices. Those of us who think that satisfactio is a description rather than "the guiding model or key notion" (xx, my emphasis) for thinking Christ crucified will need to see such support worked out in relation to the competing sotcriologies Cessario mentions (267) as well as ecumenical discussions of justification which were understandably outside the scope of this book (151). But a single book can only accomplish a single thing-and this book clearly succeeds in showing us how Thomas can be brought to bear on contemporary theological issues. All students of Aquinas and/or soteriology ought to read this text. Loyola College in Maryland Baltimore, Maryland JAMES J. BUCKLEY How We Know. Edited by MICHAEr, SHAFTO. San 1!1rancisco: Harper & Row. 1985. Pp. xv and 171. $14.95. How We Know is a collection of six papers delivered in 1984 at the twentieth Nobel Conference, held at Gustavus Adolphus College in St. Peter, Minnesota. Two words that came to my mind as I worked through the papers were "fascinating" and "frightening". The Conference dealt with cognitive science and a number of the authors have come up with interesting, provocative, and often orig'inal observations about how the human mind operates when it hies to remember and to understand. In his Introduction Michael Shafto, who is a Scientific Officer in the Personnel and Training Research Programs of the United States Office of Naval Research, notes that cognitive science as the work of a coalition of thinkers is barely a decade old, and he reminds the reader that the methods BOOK REVIEWS 59.7 of cognitive science are those of experimental psychology, physiology, and computer science. Though the Confermce was supposedly aimed at nonspecialists, the reader unfamiliar with cognitive science might find some of the papers a bit difficult. Certainly the backgrounds of the authors are very impressive. The first four papers in the collection are by Gerald Edelman, Brenda Milner, Roger C. Schank, and Herbert A. Simon respectively. Edelman is the Director and Scientific Chairman of the Neurosciences Research Program at Rockefeller University; Milner is Professor of Psychology in the Department of Neurology at McGill University: Schank is Professor and Chairman of the Computer Science Department at Yale; and Simon is Professor of Computer Science and Psychology at Carnegie-Mellon University. Calling his theory of the hum:m brain "Neural Darwinism," Edelman claims that the brain is Darwinian. Taking Darwin's theory of natural selections and applying it to the brain, Edelman argues that during ontogeny and behavior those groups of neurons are chosen that are adaptive for the organism. Milner explores the neurophysiological basis of that special moment when a new experience affects the brain. Insisting that memory is not merely a passive reproi!ucer but rather actively selective, Milner, relying on her studies of patients. with loss of memory, suggests that the frontal lobes of the brain hnve a special role in memory. Interested in the interface of mcmory anil percr-ption, Schank notes that, because human memory is dynamic and the memory of the computer is not, the -programming of the intelligent functions of... (shrink)

Scholars who have attempted to explain Iris Murdoch’s moral realism have done so in widely divergent ways, some characterizing her as a classical moral realist, others as a pragmatic moral realist, and still others as a “reflexive realist.”See, e.g., respectively, Fergus Kerr, “Back to Plato with Iris Murdoch,” in Immortal Longings: Versions of Transcending Humanity (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1997), 68–88; Sami Pihlstrom, Pragmatic Moral Realism: A Transcendental Defence (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2005); and Maria Antonaccio, Picturing the Human: The (...) Moral Thought of Iris Murdoch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). For the purpose of this article, I follow Maria Antonaccio’s characterization of these realisms. See pages 3–4. None of these attempts, however, capture adequately Murdoch’s distinctive position. In an effort to improve upon these accounts, this article argues that a proper characterization of Murdoch’s view must regard her as developing a version of m. (shrink)

In Alabaster v. Barclays Bank plc and Secretary of State for Social Security (No. 2: [2005] E.W.C.A Civ. 508, [2005] I.R.L.R. 576.) Michelle Alabaster won a grand total of £204.53 (plus £65.86 interest) after eight years of litigation, which included two visits to the Court of Appeal and one to the European Court of Justice. This marathon resulted from the sex discrimination which Alabaster had alleged in relation to the calculation of her Statutory Maternity Pay (S.M.P.) whilst she was pregnant (...) 10 years earlier. The technicalities of the statutory schemes involved should not be allowed to disguise the important principle which finally emerges in the Court of Appeal and which underlines one of the longstanding criticisms of the equality legislation, namely the requirement that a woman must compare herself with a man in order to establish unlawful sex discrimination. (shrink)

Haydar el-Herevî Horasan’dan Osmanlı topraklarına gelen önemli âlimlerdendir. Teftâzânî’nin şeçkin bir talebesi olan bu âlim I. Mehmed’ten büyük saygı görerek onun tarafından himaye edilmiştir. Herevî, Zemahşerî’nin el-Keşşâf’ı üzerine yazdığı şerhi büyük övgü ifadeleriyle I. Mehmed’e ithaf etmiş, ithafın yer aldığı mukaddimede hayat hikayesiyle ilgili önemli ayrıntılar vermiştir. Osmanlı topraklarında geçirdiği uzun yıllar sonra Timur’un oğlu Şahruh ile irtibat kuran Herevî, el-Keşşâf şerhi mukaddimesini tekrardan kaleme alarak aynı eseri bu sefer Şahruh’a ithaf etmiştir. Herevî’nin bu yeni patronaj ilişkisi mukaddimenin ikinci versiyonundan (...) öğrenilmektedir. İkinci versiyonda sadece ithaf kısmı değiştirilmemiş, yeni haminin kimliğiyle irtibatlı olarak muhteva da yeni- den kurgulanmıştır. İlk versiyonda bulunmayan önemli biyografik ayrıntılar ikinci versiyonda yer almaktadır. Mukaddimenin iki versiyonu Herevî biyografisinin neredeyse yegâne kaynağıdır. Bu makalede mukaddimenin ikinci versiyonu ilk defa gün yüzüne çıkarılmış ve her iki versiyonda verilen bilgiler bir araya getirilerek Herevî’nin biyografisi inşa edilmiştir. İki versiyonda herhangi bir tarih verilmemiş, sadece bazı şehirlerdeki ikamet süreleri belirtilmiştir. Biyografi inşa edilirken anlatıda oluşan boşluklar tarihi olaylardan hareketle doldurulmuş ve tarihlendirme yapılmıştır. Bahsedilen olaylar, yapılan nitelemeler ve verilen ikamet süreleri itibara alınarak Herevî’nin hayatının yaklaşık kırk yıllık bölümü tam olarak tarihlendirilmiş, Serahs’tan başlayarak sırasıyla Şîraz, Tebriz, Şirvan, Bursa, Edirne ve tekrar Horasan’a uzanan yıllara dair bütünlüklü bir tablo ortaya konulmuştur. Bu hayat hikayesi ulema-sultan ilişkileri, siyasî gelişmelerin ilim hayatına yansımaları ve hayatını ilim yolculuklarında geçiren bir âlimin zihin dünyası hakkında eşsiz bilgiler sunmaktadır. (shrink)